Abstract This paper examines an endogenous timing game in product differentiated duopolies under price competition when emission tax is imposed on environmental externality. We show that a simultaneous-move (sequential-move) outcome can be an equilibrium outcome in a private duopoly under significant (insignificant) environmental externality, but this result can be reversed in a mixed duopoly. We also show that when environmental externalities are significant, public leadership yields greater welfare than private leadership, and that public leadership is more robust than private leadership as an equilibrium outcome. Finally, we find that privatization can result in a public leader becoming a private leader, but this worsens welfare.
Introduction
The earlier literature on duopolistic competition analyzes the endogenous market structure based on whether firms endogenously decide on prices or quantities and whether such decisions are made sequentially or simultaneously. Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) formulated an observable delay game and showed that in a private duopoly with symmetric payoffs, firms decide simultaneously when competing in quantities and sequentially when competing in prices.
However, in the literature on mixed duopolies with asymmetric payoffs, where a profitmaximizing private firm competes with a welfare-maximizing public firm, Pal (1998) and Bárcena-Ruiz (2007) showed that the results are surprisingly reversed: firms decide sequentially when competing in quantities and simultaneously when competing in prices. 1 Besides understanding these conflicting results, recent concerns over environmental quality 1 Lu (2006) , Lu and Poddar (2009) and Heywood and Ye (2009) extended the analysis into a mixed market where a public firm competes with domestic and foreign private firms and obtained similar results. For more extensive analysis, see Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2010) , Tomaru and Kiyono (2010) , Balogh and Tasnadi (2012) , Amir and Feo (2014) , Matsumura and Ogawa (2014) , Naya (2015) and Din and Sun (2016) among others.
suggest the need for further examination of what allows for environmental externalities and for the possibility of considering public policies such as emission tax or privatization. 2 In the presence of environmental externalities, the analysis of mixed oligopolies has been prominent and thus the possible benefits of public ownership have also motivated recent analyses on mixed markets. 3 For example, Pal and Saha (2014, 2015) and Xu et al. (2016) have recently explored the interaction between privatization and emission tax in order to explain how privatization policies and emission tax affect environmental damage and social welfare. However, previous studies on environmental issues consider an exogenously fixed timing game and hence have very restrictive implications.
This paper is the first to investigate an endogenous timing game in private and mixed duopolies with environmental externalities and emission taxes. Specifically, we examine an observable delay game formulated by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) in product-differentiated duopoly markets under price competition when an emission tax is imposed on environmental externality. We find that most results in both private and mixed duopolies in the literature without externalities still hold only when environmental externalities are insignificant. For instance, we show that the equilibrium under price competition with an emission tax is a sequential-move outcome in a private duopoly, which is consistent with Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) , but a simultaneous-move outcome in a mixed duopoly, which is consistent with Bárcena-Ruiz (2007).
However, when environmental externalities are significant, the results are surprisingly reversed in both private and mixed duopolies. We show that the equilibrium under price competition with an emission tax is a simultaneous-move outcome in a private duopoly but a sequential-move outcome in a mixed duopoly. This is in sharp contrast to the results in the previous literature under price competition without externalities. Therefore, policies concerning environmental quality have a significant effect on the endogenous timing that firms choose for production. This implies that in a mixed duopoly under price competition, the analysis of a 2 In most countries, mixed markets exist in a broad range of industries such as oil, gas, automobile, steel, chemical, telecommunication, electricity, power plant, and hospital industries, which emit pollutants in the production process. In particular, many state-owned industries in transition economies have relied on highly polluting technologies. Furthermore, EU countries lead the development of environmental policies for the sustainability in a warming planet and have a non-negligible presence of public enterprises in energy-consuming industries such as transportation and automobile industries. More related descriptions can be found in Wang and Wang (2009 ), Pal and Saha (2014 , 2015 and Xu, et al. (2016) . 3 Several researchers have recently analyzed the environmental concerns of a mixed market. Beladi and Chao (2006) , Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2006) , Ohori (2006) , Cato (2008) , Wang and Wang (2009), and Lee (2015) provide various discussions on mixed markets. Recently, Clo, et al (2016) supports the positive effect of public ownership on environmental performance in European electricity industry during the two decades since the market-based instrument is introduced in 1980s.
simultaneous-move game can be problematic when environmental externality is significant.
When environmental externalities are significant, we also find that public leadership yields greater welfare than private leadership; moreover, public leadership is more robust than private leadership as an equilibrium outcome. These results are in sharp contrast to those in mixed duopolies without environmental externalities. Pal (1998) , Matsumura (2003) , and Matsumura and Ogawa (2010) showed that private leadership is more robust and more efficient. However, significant externalities can change the equilibrium outcome between private and public leaderships.
Finally, we investigate an endogenous choice on privatization in order to examine the welfare effect of privatization. We find that privatization can result in a public leader becoming a private leader, but this worsens welfare.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we formulate a productdifferentiated duopoly model in price competition with environmental externalities. Sections 3 and 4 analyze an endogenous timing game in private and mixed duopolies, respectively. Section 5 examines an endogenous choice on privatization. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
The model
We consider a standard differentiated duopoly with linear demand in Sing and Vives (1984) , where a representative consumer's utility function is given by
where i q is the output of each firm and ∈ 0,1 measures the degree of product differentiation. A higher value of b represents a lower degree of product differentiation, or higher substitutability. 
Social welfare is the sum of consumer surplus CS , the profit of both firms 
The game formulated by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) proceeds as follows. In the first stage, each firm simultaneously chooses whether to move early or late. The basic game played is simultaneous if both firms choose the same period, and sequential otherwise. In the following, we examine respectively a private duopoly where both private firms compete in price and a mixed duopoly where one private firm and one public firm compete, and we compare the results.
Private Duopoly
In this section, we first consider a fixed-timing game in private duopolies with two firms competing in prices in a simultaneous-move game and in a sequential-move game, respectively.
We then examine the first stage in an endogenous-timing game.
Simultaneous-move game
In this game, each firm chooses its price and abatement level simultaneously and independently.
Assuming interior solutions and simultaneously solving the first-order conditions for maximizing the profits of both firms in (3), we obtain the following equilibrium prices and abatement levels:
, .
The social welfare in equilibrium is
. (5) Differentiating social welfare with respect to t yields the following optimal emission tax in a simultaneous-move Bertrand game in Private duopolies (BP):
where is as presented in Appendix A. 6 Note that when , the optimal emission tax is increasing in both the degree of production differentiation, ⁄ 0, and marginal environmental damage, ⁄ 0. However, it is lower than the marginal environmental
In the first case, when , we obtain the equilibrium prices, abatement levels, and quantities of the two firms, as presented in Appendix B. 7 The equilibrium profit of the private firm, environmental damage, and welfare are, respectively, , , .
In the second case, when , the optimal emission tax is zero. The equilibrium profit of the private firm, environmental damage, and welfare are, respectively,
5 Note that the optimal emission tax can be negative when environmental externality is insignificant under duopolistic competition. Note also that the equilibrium abatement level becomes zero when a nonpositive emission tax is imposed. In order to eliminate this trivial and unrealistic situation, we focus on non-negative emission taxes in the remaining analysis. 6 For the sake of expositional convenience, we provide , , and in Appendix A. 7 For the sake of expositional convenience, we provide , , and in Appendix B.
Sequential-move game
In this game, first firm 0 and then firm 1 choose their price and abatement levels sequentially.
Then, assuming interior solutions, the first-order conditions of firm 1 to maximize its profits in (3) provide the following reaction function:
Now, the first-order conditions of firm 0 to maximize its profits in (3) with the reaction function of firm 1 in (9) provide the following equilibrium prices and abatement levels:
The social welfare in equilibrium is .
Differentiating social welfare with respect to t yields the following optimal emission tax in a sequential-move Leadership game in Private duopolies (LP):
Note that when , the optimal emission tax also increases in both the degree of production differentiation, ⁄ 0, and marginal environmental damage, ⁄ 0.
Note also that it is lower than the marginal environmental damage, 0 , for
In the first case, when , the equilibrium profit of the private firm, environmental damage, and welfare are, respectively,
In the second case, when , the optimal emission tax is zero. The equilibrium profit of the private firm, environmental damage, and welfare are, respectively, , , 
Endogenous timing game
We now discuss the first-stage choice in an endogenous timing game under price competition in private duopolies. Each firm i (i = 0,1) simultaneously chooses whether to move early ( = 1) or late ( = 2). If both firms choose the same period, the equilibrium is a simultaneous-move game.
Otherwise, the equilibrium is a sequential-move game. Table 1 provides the payoff matrix of the observable delay game in private duopolies. The proposition represents that private duopolies in price competition with optimal emission tax yield a sequential-move outcome in equilibrium when the environmental externality is insignificant. This result is consistent with the observable delay game without environmental externality, as formulated by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) . On the other hand, under price competition with significant environmental externality, a simultaneous-move outcome appears in equilibrium, which is sharply different from the previous results when environmental externality is not considered.
Mixed duopoly
In this section, we examine a mixed duopoly in which firm 0 is a welfare-maximizing public firm and firm 1 is a profit-maximizing private firm. Similarly, we first consider fixed timing games in mixed duopolies where both public and private firms compete in prices in a simultaneous-move game and in two different sequential-move games, public leadership and private leadership. We then examine the endogenous timing game.
Simultaneous-move game
In this game, both firms choose their prices and abatement levels simultaneously and independently. Assuming interior solutions, we simultaneously solve the first-order conditions of firm 0 to maximize welfare in (4) and those of firm 1 to maximize its profits in (3), to obtain the following equilibrium prices and abatement levels:
, , , .
Then, differentiating social welfare with respect to t yields the following optimal emission tax in a simultaneous-move Bertrand game in Mixed duopolies (BM):
Note that when , the optimal emission tax is increasing in both the degree of production differentiation, ⁄ 0, and marginal environmental damage, ⁄ 0. However, it is lower than the marginal environmental damage, 0 for (0,1) b  .
In the first case, when , we obtain the equilibrium prices, abatement levels, and quantities of the two firms. Note that the price of the public firm is lower than that of the private firm, whereas the output of the public firm is larger; that is, and . This shows that the public firm sets a lower price than the private firm, which does not consider consumer surplus. Furthermore, the abatement of the public firm is larger than that of the private firm, which does not consider environmental damage, .
The equilibrium profit of the private firm, environmental damage, and welfare are, respectively, as follows:
In the second case, when , the optimal emission tax is zero. This yields the following results in equilibrium:
4.2 Sequential-move game with public leadership
In this game, first the public firm and then the private firm choose their price and abatement levels sequentially. Assuming interior solutions, the first-order conditions of firm 1 to maximize its profits in (3) provide the reaction function in (9). Then, the welfare-maximizing prices and pollution abatement levels of the public firm in the second stage yield the following:
Now, differentiating social welfare with respect to t yields the following optimal emission tax in a sequential-move public Leadership in Mixed duopolies (LM):
Note that when , the optimal emission tax is increasing in both the degree of production differentiation, ⁄ 0, and degree of marginal environmental damage, ⁄ 0.
Note also that it is lower than the marginal environmental damage, 0 , for (0,1) b  .
In the first case, when , the price of the public firm is lower than that of the private firm, whereas the output of the public firm is larger; that is, and .
Furthermore, the abatement of the public firm is larger than that of the private firm, .
The equilibrium profit of the private firm, environmental damage, and welfare are, respectively,
Sequential-move game with private leadership
In this game, first the private firm and then the public firm choose their price and abatement levels sequentially. Assuming interior solutions, the first-order conditions of firm 0 to maximize the welfare in (4) provide the following reaction function:
Then, the profit-maximizing price and pollution abatement level of the private firm in the second stage yield the following results:
, ,
Now, differentiating social welfare with respect to t yields the following optimal emission tax in a sequential-move private leadership (or public Followership) Mixed duopolies (FM):
In the first case when , the optimal emission tax first increases and then decreases as the degree of production differentiation increases; that is, When we substitute into i p , i a , and i q , the price of the public firm is lower than that of the private firm, but the output of the public firm is larger than that of the private firm;
that is, and . Furthermore, the abatement of the public firm is larger than that of the private firm, .
The equilibrium profit of the private firm, environmental damage, and welfare are,
In the second case, when , the optimal emission tax is zero. This yields the following results in equilibrium: This implies that public leadership in a sequential-move game produces more output and thus more emission and higher welfare in price competition. Thus, we have the following proposition. 
Comparison Proposition 4 In mixed duopolies, the optimal emission tax is lower than marginal environmental damage, but its level in the public (private) leadership game is the highest (lowest

Endogenous timing game
We now discuss the first-stage choice in an endogenous timing game under price competition in mixed duopolies. Table 2 provides the payoff matrix of the observable delay game in mixed duopolies. The proposition represents that mixed duopolies in price competition with optimal emission tax yield a sequential-move outcome in equilibrium in an endogenous timing game when environmental externality is significant. This result sharply contrasts the previous literature in mixed duopolies without environmental externality. For example, Pal (1998) showed that firms in mixed duopolies decide simultaneously when competing in prices. However, price competition with environmental externality changes the competition structure in mixed duopolies. Thus, the assumption of a simultaneous-move game under significant environmental externality may be problematic because a simultaneous-move outcome does not appear in equilibrium.
Furthermore, we find that if environmental externality is insignificant, public leadership with optimal emission tax will be an equilibrium outcome in an endogenous timing game, yielding higher welfare than private leadership. Thus, welfare-improving public leadership is more robust than private leadership as an equilibrium outcome. Once again, these results sharply contrast those in mixed duopolies without environmental externality whereby private leadership is more robust and more efficient (see, e.g., Pal, 1998; Matsumura and Ogawa, 2010; Capuano and De Feo, 2010) .
Remark In Appendix C and D, we provide a numerical example to confirm our main results examine other scenarios. 8 In Appendix C, we compare the equilibrium outcomes between price and quantity competition, and show that most of the results under price competition can be reversed under quantity competition. In Appendix D, we consider the equilibrium outcomes in mixed duopolies under price competition by allowing an agency problem of managers in the public firm and show that some results can be affected by managers' awareness on environmental concern.
Endogenous choice on privatization policy
We next examine the endogenous choice on privatization to discuss the welfare effect of privatization policy under price competition. This proposition indicates that privatization policy can change the equilibrium of an endogenous timing game when environmental damage is sufficiently small or large. In particular, when environmental damage is sufficiently small (large), a simultaneous-move (sequential-move) outcome will become a sequential-move (simultaneous-move) outcome under privatization.
This supports the findings of the previous literature on price competition without environmental externalities that private duopoly firms decide sequentially (see Hamilton and Slutsky, 1990) whereas mixed duopoly firms decide simultaneously (see Bárcena-Ruiz, 2007) . However, when environmental externalities are very significant, the results are surprisingly reversed. That is, mixed duopolies decide sequentially but private duopolies decide simultaneously after privatization.
This proposition also indicates that the equilibrium of an endogenous timing game depends on the degree of product differentiation. If , , , the equilibrium will be a simultaneous-move (sequential-move) outcome when two products are less (more) substitutable. For example, if the two products are almost homogeneous goods, privatization would result in a public leader becoming a private leader. This proposition resembles the results of Fjell and Heywood (2004) , who examined a mixed oligopoly with homogenous outputs, to find that without environmental externalities, privatization results in a public leader becoming a private leader and reduces both output and welfare. Furthermore, Heywood and Ye (2009) incorporated endogenous timing into a quantity setting game and demonstrated that privatization will always lower social welfare. We also confirmed that privatization will always lower social welfare in an endogenous timing game with environmental externalities and emission taxes.
Concluding remarks
This paper examines an endogenous timing game in private and mixed duopolies with price competition when emission tax is imposed on environmental externality. We show that public concerns on environmental quality affect the equilibrium of an endogenous timing game, and that this depends on the degree of environmental externalities. In particular, we show that in private duopolies, a simultaneous-move (sequential-move) outcome can be an equilibrium under significant (insignificant) environmental externality; however, these results are reversed in mixed duopolies. As expected, the results under insignificant environmental externality are consistent with the results in the previous literature. However, under significant environmental externality, the results sharply contrast those in the previous literature. In fact, public concerns on environmental quality can reverse the equilibrium of an endogenous timing game. We also show that public leadership yields greater welfare than private leadership, and public leadership is more robust than private leadership as an equilibrium. Finally, we show that privatization can result in a public leader becoming a private leader, with welfare-worsening result. 
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Appendix D
We consider the equilibrium outcomes in mixed duopolies under price competition by allowing an agency problem of public firm, in which the objective function of the public firm is defined as where 0 represents the political pressure of interest group or managers' awareness on environmental concern in the public firm. That is, 1 implies that managers are more development-oriented while 1 implies that managers are more environment-friendly 9 . Notice that 1 represents a benchmark case without agency problem and thus the public firm maximizes social welfare.
For a comparable analysis, we use the same numerical example in Appendix C where A=10 and d=1. We also describe main outcomes with b and provide the figures. Then, in mixed duopolies, the outcomes of three cases are provided as follows:
First, a simultaneous-move game (BM) yields that:
, , 9 For positive values in the following analysis, we assume that 0 2.819. Second, a sequential-move game with public leadership (LM) yields that:
Third, a sequential-move game with private leadership or public followership (FM) yields that:
, , , and . Fig. D .1 provides the equilibrium results in three cases. Then, we obtain that the rank of optimal emission taxes is not affected by and thus, Proposition 4 still holds.
Proposition D 1 : In mixed duopolies, the optimal emission tax is lower than marginal environmental damage, but its level in a public (private) leadership game is the highest (lowest).
However, the ranks of environmental damage and social welfare depend on the size of , and thus the equilibrium outcomes of endogenous timing game in mixed duopolies are also affected by .
In particular, (i It states that (i) when the managers of public firm are much oriented to development, i.e., 0 0.624, a simultaneous-move game yields the highest social welfare but its environmental damage is lower than that in a public leadership game; (ii) when the managers of public firm are much concerned on environments, i.e., 1.725 2.595, a public leadership game yields the highest social welfare but its environmental damage is lower than that in a simultaneous-move game.
Finally, comparing the profit ranks of the private firm, we have: . Hence, a simultaneous-move game is the unique equilibrium of an endogenous timing game in mixed duopolies but it is welfare-inferior to a public leadership game when 0. 
